Login
website language
Français
Close panel
Votamatic
home
open surveys
Microeconomics II - PS5 - 2021
Exercise 1 - Q1: Which of the following is NOT one of the potential outcomes of a rational game?
If Marcia likes Greg and Greg invites her, Marcia says yes.
If Marcia likes Greg and Greg invites her, Greg gets a payoff of 10.
If Marcia doesn't like Greg and Greg invites her, Marcia says no.
If Marcia doesn't like Greg and Greg invites her, Greg gets a payoff of 8.
Exercise 1 - Q2: What are Greg's expected payoffs?
If Greg invites Marcia, Greg's expected payoff is 8.5; if Greg does not invite Marcia, Greg's expected payoff is 3.
If Greg invites Marcia, Greg's expected payoff is 4; if Greg does not invite Marcia, Greg's expected payoff is 3.
If Greg invites Marcia, Greg's expected payoff is 8.5; if Greg does not invite Marcia, Greg's expected payoff is 4.
If Greg invites Marcia, Greg's expected payoff is 2; if Greg does not invite Marcia, Greg's expected payoff is 3.75.
Exercise 2 - Q1: Given the symmetric strategy profile n.2, which of the following statements is wrong regarding a bidder's expected payoffs?
When a bidder's valuation is 5, her expected payoff is 0.2.
When a bidder's valuation is 7, her expected payoff is 0.45.
When a bidder's valuation is 10, her expected payoff is 0.85.
A bidder's overall expected payoff is 0.5.
Exercise 2 - Q2: Now suppose that bidder A still follows strategy profile 2, while bidder B chooses a different strategy. Which of the following statements is wrong regarding bidder B's expected payoffs?
When bidder B's valuation is 5, her expected payoff is 0 if she chooses a bid smaller than 4.
When bidder B's valuation is 5, her expected payoff is smaller or equal to zero if she chooses a bid larger than 4.
When bidder B's valuation is 7, her expected payoff is 0 if she chooses a bid smaller than 6.
When bidder B's valuation is 7, her expected payoff is smaller or equal to zero if she chooses a bid larger than 6.
Université de Genève